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CODE SECTIONS 17200 AND 17500
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This Note explores California's Unfair Competition Law and critiques
how courts have applied the commonality requirement for class
certification of Unfair Competition Law claims. In particular, this Note
considers the Unfair Competition Law in light of the combined effects
of Proposition 64's standing requirements and the California Supreme
Court's decision in In re Tobacco II Cases, which limited the scope of
Proposition 64. This Note also provides a general background of the
liability standards for each prong of the Unfair Competition Law,
examines the federal preemption defense, and proposes a new standard
for commonality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) statutes, codified in
Business and Professions Code sections 17200-17500, have an
expansive history and have varied considerably in their application
over the course of the last century. Originally, businesses
predominantly used the UCL to allege unfair competition by their
competitors.' While the statutes have always provided citizens with a
private right of action and standing to bring UCL actions,2 attorneys
general and public prosecutors most commonly brought UCL actions
until the 1990s.' Over time, private plaintiffs recognized the utility of
the UCL's broad protections,' and the number of actions brought by
private citizens spiked.'
During that time, a plaintiff could satisfy the UCL's standing
requirements fairly easily.' A private citizen could bring a UCL
action on behalf of the public without first demonstrating that he or
the public had sustained any harm.' Upon a showing that a particular
entity had engaged in unfair competition, anyone could bring an
I. Sharon J. Arkin, The Unfair Competition Law After Proposition 64: Changing the
Consumer Protection Landscape, 32 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 157 (2005) ("Historically, the law of
unfair competition and of trademark infringement ... was concerned primarily with wrongful
conduct in commercial enterprises that resulted in business loss to another, ordinarily by the use
of unfair means in drawing away customers from a competitor." (quoting People ex rel. Mosk v.
Nat'l Research Co. of Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 516, 520 (Ct. App. 1962))).
2. See Robert Carlin, Chapter 17: Giving San Francisco a Leg to Stand On in UCL Actions,
39 McGEORGE L. REV. 392, 397 (2008).
3. Arkin, supra note 1, at 155.
4. Section 17203 was amended in 1992 to extend liability to any defendant who "engages,
has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair competition." 1992 Cal. Stat. 1707. This expanded
the substantive scope of the UCL to would-be wrongdoers, in advance of their wrongful conduct.
In addition to the substantive scope, the 1992 amendment also enlarged the geographic scope of
the UCL by striking the requirement that any acts of unfair competition must happen within the
state of California. The California Supreme Court has interpreted this change to mean that the
UCL reaches out-of-state activity. Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d
1086, 1097 (Cal. 1998) ("More recently, in 1992, the Legislature. . . amended section 17203 to
expand the scope of injunctive relief to encompass past activity and out-of-state activity.").
5. Arkin, supra note 1, at 156 (providing a statistical analysis of the sharp increase in
private-citizen actions, as compared to law-enforcement actions, between 1933 and 2004).
6. See JULIA B. STRICKLAND & LISA M. SIMONETTI, STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN
LLP, 2007 OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER LEGAL
REMEDIES ACT 4 (2007), available at http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub488.pdf.
7. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190, 193 (Ct. App. 2002)
("California courts have repeatedly held that relief under the UCL is available without
individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury."); see also Carlin, supra note 2, at 397
("There was no need to demonstrate any harm on the part of the plaintiff or the public-only that
the defendant had engaged in unfair competition.").
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action-commonly referred to as a "private attorney general"
action-on behalf of himself or the public at large.'
With private attorney general actions on the rise and businesses'
publicizing the increased abuseso of the UCL, Californians-in an
effort to curb the rise of successful representative actions without a
showing of harm"-resoundingly passed Proposition 64 on the
November 2, 2004 ballot.12 In doing so, Californians imposed stricter
standing requirements for UCL actions, most notably adding an
"injury in fact" requirement and providing that all UCL claims must
satisfy the procedural class action requirements of California's class-
action statute, section 382 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. 3
However, the passage of Proposition 64 left some questions
unanswered. First, it was unclear whether the newly adopted
standing requirements would be applied retroactively to already-
pending litigation. Second, it was unclear whether all class members
or just the class representatives needed to satisfy the new standing
requirements in a UCL class action. The California Supreme Court
answered the second question in In re Tobacco II Cases4 in May
2009" in what commentators lauded as a landmark victory for UCL
8. See Carlin, supra note 2, at 396-97; Claudia Wrazel & Saskia Kim, A Primer on
Business & Professions Code Section 17200: California's Unfair Competition Law, CAL. STATE
LEGISLATURE, I (Jan. 2003), http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/committee/cl5/publications/
HearingReports/UCLbackground.doc.
9. See, e.g., Dale Kasler, Businesses Hail Prop. 64 Victory: Opponents Call It a Victory for
Polluters and Scofflaws, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 4, 2004, at A8.
10. Prior to the passage of Proposition 64, one commonly cited abuse of the UCL was the
Trevor Law Group's practice of bringing suits against thousands of small automotive repair shops
through a dummy plaintiff who had suffered no harm from the unfair business practices or false
advertising of the defendants. See Carlin, supra note 2, at 396 n.48. The Trevor Law Group made
it difficult for the defendants to organize a defense, in part due to their practice of naming tens of
thousands of co-defendants. Id.
11. See CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION: OFFICIAL VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE 40 (2004) (positing that a vote in favor of Proposition 64 would eliminate
"a loophole in California law that allows private lawyers to file frivolous lawsuits against small
businesses even though they have no ... evidence that anyone was damaged or misled," and
would "stop[] these shakedown lawsuits" and "help California's economy recover").
12. Proposition 64 passed with 59 percent of the vote. 2004 California General Election
Statewide Ballot Measure Returns, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/Returns/
prop/00.htm. (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
13. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2008). California Proposition 64 is now
codified in scattered sections of section 17200 of the California Business and Professions Code.
14. 207 P.3d 20 (Cal. 2009).
15. Id. at 25.
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plaintiffs.16 In re Tobacco II established that for class actions alleging
UCL violations, Proposition 64's standing requirements apply only
to the class representative, and not to absent class members.17
This Note addresses the recent changes to California's UCL and
the impact of In re Tobacco II on UCL litigation, specifically in the
arena of consumer class actions. Part II uses the Auction Rate
Preferred Securities (ARPS) freeze of 2008 to show how a modified
definition of commonality better realizes the interests underlying
California's UCL. Part III provides an overview of the UCL. It
examines the purpose behind the law and presents the dominant
prongs of the UCL. Within that discussion, this Note also examines
federal preemption of state law and considers the California Supreme
Court's opinion in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases."
Part IV discusses the mounting difficulty of gaining class
certification because of amended section 17204's commonality
requirements. In addition, Part IV considers the status quo in light of
In re Tobacco II and the first post-In re Tobacco II case to reach the
California Court of Appeal, Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Services,
Inc.19
Part V concludes that the best remedy for the combined effects
of Proposition 64 and recent case law is an increased willingness to
broaden the California courts' definition of commonality. Therefore,
Part VI proposes that when courts resolve the commonality issue,
they should look more closely at the defendant's alleged misconduct
rather than at differences in consumers' receipt of unfair, unlawful,
or fraudulent products and business services.
II. THE AUCTION RATE PREFERRED
SECURITIES FREEZE AS EXEMPLAR
This Note's proposal is better illustrated by considering the 2008
ARPS freeze as an example of when a modified definition of
commonality would better serve the interests underlying California's
16. Id; see Maura Dolan, Class Action Against Big Tobacco Revived; State Top Court's 4-3
Decision Surprises Those Who Thought Prop. 64 Had Ended Consumer Lawsuits, L.A. TIMES,
May 19, 2009, at A4.
17. In re Tobacco II, 207 P.3d at 25.
18. 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008).
19. 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (Ct. App. 2009).
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UCL. First, it is helpful to outline the background behind the 2008
ARPS freeze.
In early 2008, individual and institutional investors were safely
purchasing instruments known as ARPS, which are auction-style,
closed-end mutual funds with variable but relatively short maturity
dates. 20  Banks reset the ARPS rates periodically, 2' and several
brokerage firms actively promoted ARPS as having guaranteed
liquidity.2 2 Brokers touted ARPS with maturity dates as short as
seven days as safe, highly liquid, and extremely accessible.23
Essentially, some investors purchased ARPS to temporarily park
money they needed for upcoming projects while earning a
competitive interest rate and retaining the peace of mind that comes
with short-term liquidity. Unfortunately for those investors, short-
term liquidity was merely a fagade: ARPS actually carried an
undisclosed risk of auction failure.24
In February 2008, ARPS began to fail, 25 and investors began to
worry.26 The manner in which brokerage firms advertised and
marketed the ARPS to potential investors produced an informational
disconnect. While brokerage firms led investors to believe that the
auctions would guarantee redemption and liquidity at the investor's
option, the brokerage firms did not warn of the possibility that the
auctions might fail for lack of buyers. 27 Unfortunately, the worst-case
20. See generally Jenny Anderson et al., New Trouble in Auction-Rate Securities, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C6 (providing an overview of auction-rate securities and the liquidity
crisis, and reporting on the first auction failures).
21. Id.
22. See id. ("The banks typically pitch these securities ... as safe alternatives to cash [when]
[t]he bonds are, in fact, long-term securities.").
23. See id ("[T]he banks [held] weekly or monthly auctions to set the interest rates and give
holders the option of selling the securities.").
24. Id Auction failure is "when supply exceeds demand-in other words, when there are
not enough bids to purchase all the securities offered for sale in the auction." Auction Rate
Securities: What Happens When Auctions Fail, FINRA.ORG (Nov. 18, 2008),
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ProtectYourself/InvestorAlerts/Bonds/P038207.
25. See id Thomas James, chairman and chief executive of Raymond James Financial Inc.,
issued an apology to his ARPS clients in a letter filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission in January 2009. He wrote that the ARPS freeze of 2008 was the first time in nearly
two decades that auctions failed significantly. Margie Manning, Tom James Apologizes for
Auction Rate Security Purchases, TAMPA BAY BUS. J., Jan. 5, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
208450.
26. See Daisy Maxey, Discount Sales Can Be a Boon for Investors; Amid Auction-Rate
Woes, Holders ofSome Shares Find Themselves Stuck, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2008, at C13.
27. See Page Perry LLC, Citi Settles $72 Million Lawsuit Involving Auction Rate Securities,
INVESTMENT FRAUD LAWYER BLOG (Jan. 18, 2010), http://www.investmentfraudlawyer
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scenario became reality: the buyer's market vanished, auctions
failed, and ARPS investors were left with illiquid pieces of paper.28
As a result, the ARPS freeze may have frozen up to $330 billion in
assets.29
Shortly after that debacle, investors demanded that banks and
brokerage firms redeem the investors' ARPS based on the liquidity
representations that the individual brokers made to investors. 30 The
firms told some ARPS investors that they should have read the fine
print in their fund prospectuses-which some never received-rather
than rely upon individual broker representations." Understandably,
investors were furious.3 2 What they had believed to be liquid
securities turned out to be frozen assets with no ascertainable
maturity date-the ARPS could take years to redeem. Perhaps the
most ominous quality of those ARPS was that there was no
guarantee that they could ever be redeemed.33
The 2008 ARPS freeze presents a clear example of when
consumers might elect to pursue claims against businesses for
violations of Business & Professions Code sections 17200-17500. A
cursory review of the facts suggests a fraudulent prong claim, a
deceptive advertising claim, and possibly an unfair business practice
claim as well. And while investors affected by the ARPS freeze were
sophisticated and consulted lawyers to bring individual lawsuits,
unfortunately this type of deceptive marketing of securities probably
would not meet California's current commonality requirements for
class certification in a UCL representative action. The California
Supreme Court has declined to certify UCL classes where individual
blog.com/2010/01/citi-settles_72_millionlawsui.html#more ("Auction rate securities were once
routinely marketed as safe, cash equivalents that were highly liquid, but the broker-dealers who
sold them failed to disclose that liquidity was entirely dependent upon the success of the auction
process.").
28. Id.
29. Associated Press, Citigroup and UBS Agree to Buy Back Risky Securities, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2008, at B8; see Jenny Anderson et al., supra note 20, at C6.
30. See Robert, Comment to When the Collapsed Auction Rate Securities (ARS) Market Gets
Personal, BLOGGINGSTOCKS (Feb. 28 2008, 10:39 AM), http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/
02/27/when-the-collapsed-auction-rate-securities-ars-market-gets-per/.
31. See Lisa Swanson, Comment to When the Collapsed Auction Rate Securities (ARS)
Market gets Personal, BLOGGINGSTOCKS (Feb. 28, 2008, 4:48 PM), http://www.blogging
stocks.com/2008/02/27/when-the-collapsed-auction-rate-securities-ars-market-gets-per/.
32. See id.
33. See Page Perry LLC, supra note 27.
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brokers or subcontractors were responsible for the alleged wrongful
conduct.34 The court denied certification for lack of commonality
because it could not conclude that each broker described the ARPS
to potential investors in exactly or substantially the same way.
This Note challenges the current commonality barrier, which
would probably block cases arising from events like the 2008 ARPS
freeze from achieving class certification, and recommends that courts
scrutinize the common issues of law that underlie the instances of
fraudulent marketing. In the ARPS freeze, the securities operated in
exactly the same way: regardless of the wording, all investors were
promised that their investments would be liquid, and all investors
suffered the same type of harm-the freezing of their assets.3 1 If
courts choose to look for them, the requirements of commonality will
be met. A less restrictive definition of commonality would allow
investors affected by the ARPS freeze to bring a UCL class action
against the brokerage firms that sold the ARPS with the promise of
liquidity. Certifying the class would not guarantee recovery, but it
would allow class members to more easily get their day in court.
III. EXAMINING CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
After the enactment of California's Unfair Competition Law in
1933,6 California became one of the most consumer-friendly states
in actions alleging fraudulent and unfair business practices."
34. See Kaldenbach v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637 (Ct. App. 2009)
(affirming class certification on the grounds that individual issues predominated where
independent contractor agents sold the allegedly deceptive and fraudulent products).
35. Consider an investor with $400,000 in liquid assets who purchases $200,000 worth of
ARPS with the intention of redeeming his securities within two weeks to purchase property.
Suppose further that this investor has already agreed to purchase the property and must make
payment shortly after the upcoming maturity date for his short-term "liquid" ARPS investments.
The ARPS freeze would prevent this investor from making his contemplated property investment.
Further, because of his lost business opportunity, his damages would likely be much greater than
those of another investor with no immediate need to redeem her ARPS funds. Additionally, this
hypothetical investor has half of his liquid assets frozen in ARPS, forcing him to use the entire
remainder of his liquid assets to complete the deal or else breach the purchase agreement and
suffer further damages on account of the contractual breach. In short, the ARPS had no
"redeeming qualities," in either meaning of the term.
36. See Arkin, supra note 1, at 156 (discussing the enactment of California Civil Code
section 3389 in 1933 and its subsequent reclassification in the Business and Professions Code).
37. See Brian Wolfman, Dear California Supreme Court: Did Prop 64 Impose a Reliance
Requirement?, CONSUMER L. & POL'Y BLOG (Sept. 15, 2006), http://pubcit.type
pad.com/clpblog/2006/09/dear california.html (recognizing that prior to Proposition 64,
California's UCL was regarded as "one of the nation's most plaintiff-favorable, consumer-
friendly consumer protection statutes").
360
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Originally, California's UCL allowed for injunctive relief and
provided broad, sweeping protections against false advertising and
unfair business practices. The UCL was so far reaching in part
because it authorized actions brought by both public prosecutors and
private attorneys general,38 seeking relief on behalf of themselves or
third parties." Those private attorney general actions effectively
provided vehicles for policing unlawful business practices without
prior showings that plaintiffs had been injured by those practices.4 0
In 1963, the Legislature expanded the UCL's scope even further.
Because the goal of the UCL is "to address the general societal harm
that results when business enterprises act illegally or unethically,"4 1
the focus of unfair business practice litigation shifted away from the
harm that one business caused another42 and instead shifted toward
the harm that one business caused the entire consuming public.43
Therefore, the legislature amended the UCL to protect against "any
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.""
38. Press Release, Pillsbury Winthrop LLP, California Voters Limit Private Enforcement of
Unfair Competition Law (Nov. 4, 2004) (on file with author) (describing California's UCL as
"truly unusual and abuse prone" because it allowed any person to sue as a "private attorney
general").
39. See Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 667 (Cal.
1983).
40. See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1095 (Cal. 1998)
(acknowledging that since the inception of California's UCL, unfair competition actions have
been able to be prosecuted "by 'any person').
41. Arkin, supra note 1, at 157.
42. The California Supreme Court has recognized that although the tort of unfair business
competition historically required a competitive injury among business entities, "the language of
section 17200 . . . 'demonstrates a clear design to protect consumers as well as competitors by its
final clause, permitting inter alia, any member of the public to sue on his own behalf or on behalf
of the public generally."' Comm. on Children's Television, Inc., 673 P.2d at 667 (emphasis
added) (quoting Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass'n. of Oakland, Inc., 496 P.2d 817, 828 (Cal.
1972)); Arkin, supra note 1, at 157 (discussing the appreciably broadened and changing legal
concept of unfair competition); see also Barquis, 496 P.2d at 829 ("[C]onsumers, rather than
competitors, need the greatest protection from sharp business practices."); Arkin, supra note 1, at
157 (quoting People ex. rel. Mosk v. Nat'l Research Co. of Cal., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765, 770
(1962), and discussing how "the legal concept of unfair competition broadened appreciably" and
changed)).
43. Bank of the W. v. Superior Ct., 833 P.2d 545, 551 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Barquis, 496
P.2d at 828).
44. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
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A. Stating a Cause ofAction Under Section 17200
On a superficial level, section 17200-the heart of the UCL-
appears simple. The defining section is one sentence long and does
not make sesquipedalian references. Section 17200 simply reads,
"[a]s used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include
any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of Division 7
of the Business and Professions Code."4 5 However, despite the
brevity of section 17200, courts have struggled to pinpoint the
bounds of the UCL. Over the course of years, California courts have
developed bodies of case law defining the three dominant prongs of
the UCL. These three prongs-unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent-
provide three broad umbrellas for a plaintiff s action under the UCL.
Additionally, since section 17200 "is written in the disjunctive, it
establishes three varieties of unfair competition-acts or practices
which are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent."4 6 In other words, "a
practice is prohibited as 'unfair' or 'deceptive' even if not 'unlawful'
and vice versa." 47
1. Unlawful
Before considering the current commonality standard for class
certification of UCL actions, it is critical to understand the
requirements of the underlying UCL cause of action, beginning with
the unlawful prong. California courts have recognized that the UCL's
unlawful prong allows for actions based on any unlawful act.48
Essentially, the California Supreme Court found that the UCL
"'borrows' violations of other laws and treats these violations, when
committed pursuant to business activities, as unlawful practices
independently actionable under [the UCL]."4 9 Such UCL claims
include actions predicated on laws at virtually every level of
government.50 State statutes," state regulations,52 federal statutes, 53
45. Id.
46. Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 1999)
(quoting Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 98 (Ct. App. 1996)).
47. Id.
48. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234 (Ct. App. 1996).
49. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Superior Ct., 826 P.2d 730, 734 (Cal. 1992).
50. See STRICKLAND & SIMONETTI, supra note 6, at 10.
362
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federal regulations,54 local ordinances," and standards of professional
conduct 6  have all provided bases for UCL unlawful-prong
litigation."
Based on this interpretation, the unlawful prong of the UCL
makes it possible to enforce the provisions of any law regardless of
whether the underlying law itself includes an enforcement
mechanism." This is because the plaintiff's underlying claim is a
UCL claim alleging violations of section 17200 rather than a claim
based on the predicate law.59 In the past, UCL defendants tried to
avoid liability by asserting that because the predicate law does not
have an enforcement mechanism, it therefore cannot form the basis
for a UCL claim.6 o The California Supreme Court rejected this
defense and resoundingly cemented section 17200 as an
independently available remedy against unlawful-prong actions.1
a. Federal preemption ofstate law in UCL unlawful-prong actions
Considering the defenses available to UCL defendants is
important to the class certification inquiry because a successful
51. See, e.g., Powers v. Pottery Barn, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 694-95 (Ct. App. 2009)
(allowing a UCL unlawful-prong action where plaintiff alleged that Pottery Barn's collection of
customer e-mail addresses in conjunction with credit card purchases violated the Song-Beverly
Credit Card Act of 1971, a California state statute, and also gave rise to a UCL claim).
52. See People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 174-75 (Ct.
App. 1984) (allowing a UCL unlawful prong action predicated on nursing-home regulations).
53. See Roskind v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 262 (Ct. App.
2000) ("[Clase authority clearly provides that violation of a federal law may serve as a predicate
for a section 17200 action.").
54. See Sw. Marine, Inc. v. Triple A Mach. Shop, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 805, 808 (N.D. Cal.
1989) (allowing a Navy regulation to serve as a predicate for a UCL unlawful-prong action).
55. Saunders v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 441 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing People v.
McKale, 602 P.2d 731, 733-34 (Cal. 1979)) ("The 'unlawful' practices forbidden by
section 17200 are any practices forbidden by law, be it civil or criminal, federal, state, or
municipal, statutory, regulatory or court-made.").
56. See id. at 441 (observing that a UCL unlawful-prong action may borrow from any law,
be it civil or criminal, regardless of whether the law includes a private right of action, including a
state-licensing statute governing certified shorthand reporters).
57. STRICKLAND & SIMONETTI, supra note 6, at 10.
58. See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 950 P.2d 1086, 1099 (Cal. 1998)
(rejecting defendant's argument that plaintiffs UCL claim should fail because the predicate law
lacks an enforcement mechanism and finding instead that the legislature's clear intent was that
remedies and penalties under the UCL should be cumulative to other remedies and penalties).
59. Arkin, supra note 1, at 158.
60. See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, Inc., 950 P.2d at 1096.
61. Id. at 1099.
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defense will preclude a court from ever reaching the commonality
issue.62 Therefore, an important part of UCL litigation for plaintiffs
consists of understanding and successfully attacking available UCL
defenses.
Defendants in UCL actions have several defenses at their
disposal.63 For unlawful-prong claims in particular, one such defense
is the federal-preemption defense.' The idea of federal preemption
stems from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution." To
establish this defense, a defendant must successfully argue that
federal law either expressly or impliedly preempts the state law or
62. If a UCL defendant can show that the alleged unlawful conduct is protected, then the
court may grant a motion to dismiss and will no longer consider certifying the class. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
63. See generally STRICKLAND & SIMONETTI, supra note 6, at 11-12 (outlining defenses
specific to unlawful-prong claims and noting that "[a]n affirmative defense to a violation of the
underlying law also is a defense to the attendant unlawful claim").
64. See, e.g., In re Tobacco II Cases, 163 P.3d 106 (Cal. 2007) (holding that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331, preempts any state-law cause of action
that seeks to regulate cigarette advertising on the ground that it targets minors and encourages
them to begin smoking). The federal-preemption defense may take several different forms. See
generally Crystal Yagoobian, Anticipating Defenses to UCL Claims, CONSUMER ADVOC. LEGAL
UPDATE, (Jan. 8, 2010, 8:03 AM), http://consumeradvocatelegalupdate.com/2010/01/articles/
class-actions/anticipating-defenses-to-ucl-claims (describing different forms of the federal-
preemption defense). One type of federal-preemption defense is where federal law specifically
bars the claim brought under a predicate state law. E.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Superior Ct.,
265 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (Ct. App. 1990). A second type of federal-preemption defense is a
showing that the alleged unlawful conduct is specifically permitted by federal law despite a state
law that makes the alleged misconduct unlawful. E.g., Shvarts v. Budget Grp., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr.
2d 722, 727 (Ct. App. 2000). A third type of federal-preemption defense is where the predicate
state law addresses areas so densely occupied by federal law that courts decline to allow a state
law to form a UCL predicate. E.g., Cong. of Cal. Seniors v. Catholic Healthcare W., 104 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 655, 668 (Ct. App. 2001). One recent development in the area of federal preemption is
the landmark case of Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 1 (2009), in which the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected an implied federal-conflict-preemption defense that argued that a stricter state drug-
labeling law would obstruct the purposes and objectives of federal drug-labeling regulations
prescribed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Id. at 25. The Court held that the FDA's
approval of an informational drug label does not preempt a claim brought under stricter state laws
requiring a more detailed drug label. Id. In Wyeth, the plaintiff brought a product-liability claim
against a drug manufacturer for failure to warn of the dangers inherent in the intravenous
administration of their anti-nausea drug through the "IV push" method rather than the "IV drip"
method. Id. at 2-3. Since the FDA had already approved this particular label, the defendants
argued that they could not modify the labels to comply with Vermont's stricter state laws, which
required a more detailed warning label. Id. at 12. The Court ultimately rejected this argument,
applying the presumption that the historic police powers of the states may not be superseded by
federal acts and acknowledging that this principle also applies to claims of implied conflict
preemption. Id at 25. Wyeth stands for the principle that the issue of federal preemption is, at its
very core, an issue of congressional intent. Id at 17-19.
65. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
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regulation upon which the plaintiff bases the UCL unlawful-prong
claim.66 The issue of federal preemption is primarily an examination
of congressional intent to preempt state laws or to allow states to
occupy particular fields of regulation.67
b. The significance of In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and
the future of implied federal preemption
Under the current Business and Professions Code
sections 17200-17500, the federal preemption defense is an
important concern for UCL plaintiffs because a successful showing
can bar an entire UCL claim, effectively killing litigation at the
pleading stage and before the court even considers issues of class
certification.6 8 Since the focus of this Note is to address the
narrowing applications of commonality to UCL-class-certification
decisions, it is important to first consider obstacles to reaching the
class certification stage and to then understand how UCL plaintiffs
may overcome them. A proper understanding of the federal-
preemption defense will aid in plaintiffs successfully reaching the
class-certification stage and in addressing the problems of UCL
representative action commonality that this Note raises.
In In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, the California Supreme
Court decided whether federal preemption constitutes a total bar to a
UCL unlawful-prong claim predicated on the violation of a state
law.69 In that case, plaintiffs brought a class-action lawsuit against
various grocery store owners for failing to disclose that they sold
artificially colored salmon." The artificial-coloring distinction was
important because wild salmon have a fleshy, pink color while
66. See generally AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 53 (2009) (providing an overview of
constitutional law relating to federal preemption and discussing express, implied, and conflict
preemption as functions of congressional intent).
67. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 17-19; Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Cucamonga, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 835 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The intent of Congress is paramount in
determining whether preemption applies."); see also Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (discussing express and implied federal preemption of state
laws and finding that "[i]n the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to pre-
empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for
supplementary state regulation").
68. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
69. 175 P.3d 1170, 1184 (Cal. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 896 (2009).
70. Id. at 1173.
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farmed salmon have a grayish color." Additionally, some research
suggests that artificial coloring and food additives pose health risks.72
Believing that consumers used the color of salmon to infer origin,
quality, freshness, and flavor, plaintiffs asserted claims of false
advertising, negligent misrepresentation, and unfair and deceptive
trade practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act 7 3 (CLRA),
in addition to asserting a UCL unlawful-prong claim premised on
California's Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law74 ("Sherman
Law").7
The Sherman Law prohibits the artificial coloring of food
without first disclosing the additives on a food label." The issue in In
re Farm Raised Salmon Cases was whether section 337(a) of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 77 (FDCA) preempted
plaintiffs' UCL claim because the plaintiffs based the claim on the
violation of a state law where there was an applicable federal law."
Defendants argued that the FDCA regulated exactly the type of
nondisclosure of food additives that plaintiffs complained of.79
The trial court held, and the appellate court affirmed, that the
FDCA preempted the plaintiffs' UCL claim." On appeal, the
California Supreme Court reversed, noting that federal preemption is
a question of congressional intent." Based on its analysis of FDCA
sections 337(a) and 343(k), the California Supreme Court held that
the identical requirements of the Sherman Law and the FDCA
necessarily meant that Congress did not intend for the FDCA to
preempt state law.82
71. Id
72. See, e.g., David W. Schab & Nhi-ha T. Trinh, Do Artificial Food Colors Promote
Hyperactivity in Children with Hyperactive Syndromes? A Meta-Analysis of Double-Blind
Placebo-Controlled Trials, 25 J. DEV. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 423, 428 (2004).
73. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1785 (West 2009).
74. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 109875-111915 (West 2006).
75. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1172-74.
76. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 109895, 110370, 110470 (West 2006).
77. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399(a) (2006).
78. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1173.
79. Id. at I174.
80. Id.
81. Id.at1176.
82. Id. at 1175-77, 1184; see Rebecca Tushnet, Preemption Argument Swims Upstream to
Die, REBECCA TUSHNET'S 43(B)LOG, (Feb. 17, 2008, 10:56 PM), http://tushnet.blogspot.con/
2008/02/preemption-argument-swims-upstream-to.html.
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With respect to the defendants' preemption argument, the
California Supreme Court also distinguished between express
preemption and implied preemption." The court found that Congress
has the express authority to preempt state law where two conditions
are satisfied: (1) the state law at issue concerns matters that lie within
the authority of Congress; and (2) Congress expressly states that it
intends for federal regulations to preempt state law.84
Despite this discussion of Congress's powers to preempt state
laws, the California Supreme Court in In re Farm Raised Salmon
Cases focused on the states' police powers and concluded that there
is a strong presumption against preemption of state-law causes of
action.8 ' Because the UCL is a cause of action arising under
California state law and the Sherman Law is also a California state
law, the Court favored a presumption against preemption.86 The
difficulty in rejecting the defendants' preemption argument derived
from the fact that California's Sherman Law was entirely derived
from the federal FDCA 8 7-in fact, the statutory language was
identical. 8 But because California's Sherman Law was identical in
scope to the FDCA, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' UCL
claims could go forward."
83. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1176.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)); Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly,
95 P.3d 422, 428 (Cal. 2004); see Viva! Int'l Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail
Operations, Inc., 162 P.3d 569, 572 (Cal. 2007).
86. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1176.
87. Seeid.at1175.
88. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110740 (West 2006) ("Any food is
misbranded if it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical
preservative, unless its labeling states that fact. Exemptions may be established by the
department.") with 21 U.S.C. § 343(k) (2006) ("A food shall be deemed to be misbranded ...
(k) If it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical preservative,
unless it bears labeling stating that fact, except that to the extent that compliance with the
requirements of this paragraph is impracticable, exemptions shall be established by regulations
promulgated by the Secretary.").
89. See In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1178-81 (considering the significance
of the identical statutory language of California's Sherman Law and the FDCA and concluding
that a mere showing of identical statutory language does not per se preempt the enforcement of a
state regulation through private right of action).
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c. Federal preemption: State and federal regulations with
identical statutory language
The FDCA prohibits misbranding of any food." Section 343(k)
of the FDCA deems a food misbranded if "it bears or contains
any ... artificial coloring . .. unless it bears labeling stating that
fact."9' After it adopted the FDCA, Congress passed the Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 199092 (NLEA). This act amended the
FDCA because Congress wanted to create a uniform national
standard and was concerned that states might adopt inconsistent food
labeling requirements.93 The NLEA added an explicit preemption
provision to FDCA section 343-1(a):
"[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may directly
or indirectly establish under any authority or continue in
effect as to any food in interstate commerce . .. any
requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by
section . .. [343(k)] of this title that is not identical to the
requirement of such section . . . ."9
Thus, in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, the defendants
argued that the plaintiffs' claims are impliedly preempted because
plaintiffs' Sherman Law and UCL claims obstructed the objectives
and purposes of Congress.95 However, the California Supreme Court
relied on section 343-1(a) in reasoning that federal law only
preempts state law causes of action that are not identical to federal
standards-it does nothing to interfere with identical state laws.96
Consequently, the California Supreme Court reversed the appellate
90. 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (2006).
91. Id. § 343(k).
92. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990).
93. 136 CONG. REC. 20414, 20418 (1990) (remarks of Rep. Waxman during a debate on
H.R. 3562, 101st Cong. (2d sess. 1990)).
94. Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2362-2363 (1990) (emphasis added).
95. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1177 (Cal. 2008).
96. Id at 1178 ("The words of section 343-1 clearly and unmistakably evince Congress's
intent to authorize states to establish laws that are 'identical to' federal law.") see Consumer
Justice Ctr. v. Olympian Labs, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749, 756-57 (Ct. App. 2002) (discussing 21
U.S.C. § 343-1(a) in the context of federal preemption of state claims and taking explicit notice of
the provision allowing states to adopt food-labeling requirements that are identical to the federal
requirements imposed by § 343(r) without subjecting the states' identical regulations to federal
preemption).
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court and allowed the UCL unlawful claim based on the alleged
violation of the Sherman Law to proceed."
d. The utility of In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases for UCL plaintiffs
The decision in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases remains an
important tool for plaintiffs in UCL unlawful-prong claims where
defendants have raised the issue of federal preemption." Although it
is particularly relevant for its interpretation of FDCA section 343-
1(a), the court's holding is also highly relevant to future cases in
which the predicate state law has identical statutory language to that
of a federal law or regulation.9 9
2. Unfair
UCL plaintiffs who allege an unfair business practice must meet
the standard for unfair conduct as defined by the court.'oo For this
reason, it is important to examine the development of courts'
understanding of UCL unfair conduct.
The term "unfair" is not precisely defined by the UCL statute,
and courts have struggled to provide a bright-line rule."' California
courts have put forth several different tests for determining what
constitutes unfair conduct that rises to a level actionable under the
UCL.10 2 The existence of multiple tests has further complicated the
97. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1174 n.5 (citing Comm. on Children's
Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 667-69 (Cal. 1983)).
98. Id. at 1184.
99. Id. at 1178-81.
100. See Gregory v. Albertson's, Inc., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 393-94 (Ct. App. 2002).
101. Id at 393-95 (discussing the lack of a workable definition for the UCL's unfair prong).
But see Buller v. Sutter Health, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 55 (Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting the appellant's
position that the test for UCL unfairness involved balancing the utility of the defendant's conduct
against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim and instead finding that the test for UCL
unfairness "requires [an] allegedly unfair business practice [to] be 'tethered' to a legislatively
declared policy or [have] some actual or threatened impact on competition" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
102. Two of the most common tests formerly employed by California courts were a balancing
test and a tailored test borrowed from Federal Trade Commission (FTC) guidelines. The first test
required courts to balance the challenged practice's impact on the alleged victim against the
conduct's utility. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234 (Ct.
App. 1996) (describing the standard as "intentionally broad, thus allowing courts maximum
discretion to prohibit new schemes to defraud"). The second test adopted a definition of unfair
from FTC guidelines, labeling a business act or practice as unfair where it "offends an established
public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or
substantially injurious to consumers." Cmty. Assisting Recover, Inc. v. Aegis Sec. Ins. Co., 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes,
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unfairness inquiry, and courts have adopted tests for unfairness that
are reserved exclusively for competitor-competitor UCL actions but
that do not apply to consumer claims."'
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Cel-Tech
Communications v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone,104 courts
generally applied the balancing test from South Bay Chevrolet v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp."' to determine whether a business
act or practice was unfair under the UCL.' The California Supreme
Court had not yet distinguished different tests for different types of
unfair-prong actions-namely, the consumer-business context and
the competitor-competitor context.107 The California Supreme Court
squarely addressed this issue in Cel-Tech, where it had to decide
which test for unfairness to apply to a competitor-competitor UCL
action in which the plaintiff, a cellular telephone seller, alleged that
the defendant, a competitor, was intentionally selling its product
below cost in order to push the plaintiff out of the market.os
Because the traditional South Bay balancing test was a less-than-
ideal fit for this scenario, the Cel-Tech court propounded a new test
for UCL unfair conduct after it expressed dissatisfaction with the
previously amorphous state of the law.o' Recognizing that a more
precise test was necessary to ensure reasonable certainty of
expectations for both businesses and consumers, the Cel-Tech court
defined unfair business acts or practices as "conduct that threatens an
incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit
of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the
Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 164, 177 (Ct. App. 1984)); see S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 316 (Ct. App. 1999); see also STRICKLAND & SIMONETrI, supra note
6, at 12 (discussing courts' two tests for defining unfairness).
103. See Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 543-44 (Cal.
1999).
104. Id. at 527.
105. 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301 (Ct. App. 1999).
106. See Andrew H. Struve & Eugene Hahm, Appellate Court Urges Clarification of UCL's
Definition of "Unfair" in Consumer Cases, 17200LAW@MANATr, (Manatt, Phelps & Phillips,
L.A., Cal., Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.manatt.com/news.aspx?id=3770.
107. See Cel-Tech, 973 P.2dat 544 n.11.
108. Id. at 532.
109. Id. at 543 (noting that the South Bay test's "[v]ague references to 'public policy,' for
example, provide little real guidance").
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same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or
harms competition.""o
The court expressly limited its decision to actions by
competitors alleging anticompetitive practices by disclaiming any
application of its new rule to other contexts in footnote 12."' As
courts interpreted and applied Cel- Tech in later cases, however, the
disclaimer in footnote 12 proved to be less enlightening than the
court had perhaps intended. For example, some courts read Cel-Tech
literally: finding that the disclaimer was expressed in disjunctive
language,1 12 they concluded that the earlier South Bay balancing test
for unfairness was still in full force within the context of consumer
actions, despite Cel-Tech's new definition of "unfair.""'
The Cel-Tech decision put in flux the rule for unfairness as it
applied to consumer suits.'14 The appellate districts split."' In
Gregory v. Albertson 's, Inc.,"' the First District Court of Appeal
returned to the older test for unfairness, which required that the
conduct "offend[] an established public policy or ... [be] immoral,
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to
consumers."" 7  The Gregory court imposed an additional
requirement: the "allegedly unfair business practice [had to] be
'tethered' to a legislatively declared policy or [have] some actual or
110. Id at 544.
Ill. Id. at 544 n. 12 ("This case involves an action by a competitor alleging anticompetitive
practices. Our discussion and this test are limited to that context. Nothing we say relates to
actions by consumers or by competitors alleging other kinds of violations of the unfair
competition law such as 'fraudulent' or 'unlawful' business practices or 'unfair, deceptive, untrue
or misleading advertising."').
112. The disjunctive language in footnote 12 was the court's statement that "[n]othing we say
relates to actions by consumers or by competitors." Id. at 544.
113. See McKell v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227, 240 (Ct. App. 2006) (describing
the test for unfairness as a balancing test that must "weigh the utility of the defendant's conduct
against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim" (quoting Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co., 93
Cal. Rptr. 2d 413, 422 (Ct. App. 2000))).
114. See Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 735 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 641 (Ct. App. 2006) ("[A]ppellate court
opinions have been divided over whether the definition of 'unfair' under the UCL as stated in
Cel-Tech should apply to UCL actions brought by consumers.").
115. See Lozano, 504 F.3d at 736.
116. 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 2002).
117. Id. at 394 (citing Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 98 (Ct. App.
1996)).
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threatened impact on competition."".. Later, the Second District
Court of Appeal formulated a more precise test for unfairness in
Camacho v. Automobile Club of Southern California."l9 The
Camacho court relied on the language and policy considerations
underlying section 5 of the FTCA in concluding that unfair conduct
must have three elements: "(1) the consumer injury must be
substantial; (2) the injury must not be outweighed by any
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) it must
be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have
avoided."1 20
The split among California appellate courts became so
disruptive that the Fourth District Court of Appeal posed directed
questions to the California Supreme Court or the legislature to
resolve. 121
3. Fraudulent
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court,122 the
court discussed the test for claims brought under the third prong of
the UCL. The court observed that "'fraud' contemplated by
section 17200's third prong bears little resemblance to common law
fraud or deception."1 23 The test for fraud under the UCL "is whether
118. Buller v. Sutter Health, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 47, 55 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Belton v.
Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 645 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Gregory, 128
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 393-95)).
119. 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2006).
120. Id. at 776-77 (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 849 F.2d 1354,
1364 (11th Cir. 1988)).
121. Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634, 646-47 (Ct. App. 2006) (posing
the following questions: "[1] Did the Supreme Court limit its holding in Cel-Tech to UCL actions
brought by competitors simply because the circumstance of a consumer UCL action was not
before it, or because the definition of 'unfair' should be different depending on whether the action
is brought by a consumer or a competitor? [2] Was the Supreme Court expressing the view that
regulation of competitive conduct is contained in existing legislation, but there is no analogous
law pertaining to consumers? [3] Should a broader definition of 'unfair' apply in consumer
actions because consumers require more protection than competitors even though such a
distinction between consumers and competitors is not reflected in the language of the statute?
[4] Is the Cel-Tech definition of 'unfair' too narrow to sufficiently protect consumers? (5] Is the
definition of 'unfair' applied in Smith [v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399
(Ct. App. 2001),] ... too amorphous in the consumer context, and does it provide 'too little
guidance to courts and business'?").
122. 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (Ct. App. 1996).
123. Id. at 235.
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the public is likely to be deceived."l24 The standard is based on the
expectations of a reasonable consumer.'2 5 Consequently, UCL fraud
violations, unlike common-law fraud, "can be shown even if no one
was actually deceived, relied upon the fraudulent practice, or
sustained any damage."l26
Recently, the Second District Court of Appeal upheld the "likely
to deceive" standard of liability for UCL fraudulent-prong actions. In
Morgan,127 plaintiffs who bought Sony Ericsson T68i premium cell
phones from AT&T brought a UCL action against the
telecommunications company, alleging violations of all three prongs
of the UCL. 128 The plaintiffs claimed that they bought the T68i from
AT&T based on AT&T's advertisements about the phone's
international capabilities and other advanced technologies. 129 The
plaintiffs alleged, however, that at the time of the advertisements
AT&T was already planning to degrade its 1900-megahertz wireless
network in a way that would not support the T68i, rendering those
phones "essentially unstable" because they operated exclusively on
the AT&T network.13 0 The plaintiffs argued that based on AT&T's
advertisements, the average consumer would believe that AT&T's
network would support the T68i for the lifetime of the phone.'
AT&T tried to defeat the claim by arguing that its representations
were mere "puffery," or statements of opinion, and that no
reasonable consumer would consider them to constitute statements of
fact.132 In discussing the UCL fraud claim, the court reiterated the
following established rule:
[A] fraudulent business practice is one that is likely to
deceive members of the public.... A UCL claim based on
the fraudulent prong can be based on representations that
deceive because they are untrue, but "also those which may
124. Id. (citing Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668
(Cal. 1983)).
125. AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LITIG., CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 402
(2009).
126. Id. (citing Comm. on Children's Television, Inc., 673 P.2d at 668).
127. 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768 (Ct. App. 2009).
128. Id. at 779.
129. See id. at 775.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 776.
132. See id at 781.
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be accurate on some level, but will nonetheless tend to
"1133mislead or deceive ....
Common-law fraud differs from the UCL's fraudulent-business-
practice prong. Common-law fraud requires a statement to be (1)
actually false, (2) known to be false by the perpetrator, and (3)
reasonably relied upon by someone who incurs damages as a
result. 134 In contrast, UCL fraud does not require the statement or
representation to be false-it need only be likely to deceive a
reasonable consumer. In fact, under the UCL, "[a] perfectly true
statement couched in such a manner that it is likely to mislead or
deceive the consumer, such as by failure to disclose other relevant
information, is actionable ....
In response to common-law or other statutory actions alleging
fraud, courts have articulated policy concerns that support a
heightened pleading standard.136 Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require allegations of fraud to be pleaded with
specificity.'37 Because the UCL has three separate prongs and one of
those prongs involves fraud, it is important to note the potential
implications, if any, of a heightened pleading standard for UCL
fraudulent-prong actions.
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
UCL fraud action must meet a heightened pleading standard in
Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.13 1
There, plaintiffs brought an action for common-law fraud in addition
to UCL claims, alleging that the defendants had conducted
133. Id. at 785 (citation omitted) (quoting McKell v. Wash. Mut., Inc., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227,
239 (Ct. App. 2006)) (citing In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 29 (Cal. 2009)).
134. See Arkin, supra note 1, at 161-62.
135. Morgan, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 785 (quoting McKell, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 239).
136. See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2nd Cir. 1994); see also
Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548-49 (2007) (extending the heightened pleading
standard beyond mere fraud in an antitrust case between competitors where the plaintiff alleged
parallel conduct in the complaint by simply asserting that the defendant engaged in a conspiracy
in restraint of trade). The court held that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must
allege enough facts in a complaint to make their claim plausible. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Twombly remains one of the most cited decisions by defendants bringing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (2010). To date it has been cited at least 24,000
times. Id. at 1296 n.9.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
138. 673 P.2d 660, 667 (Cal. 1983).
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fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive advertising in marketing
sugared breakfast cereals.' Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants
had engaged in a nationwide, long-term advertising campaign
designed to persuade children, by imagery and example, to influence
their parents to buy sugared cereals.'4 0 After a preliminary discussion
of whether the standard of "likely to deceive a reasonable consumer"
should apply to the cereal companies with regard to the parents who
purchased the cereal or to the children who viewed the television
commercials, the court concluded that "[t]he requirement that fraud
must be pleaded with specificity .. . does not apply to causes of
action under the consumer protection statutes."'4 1 Therefore,
complaints alleging violations of the UCL fraud prong are subject to
the ordinary pleading standard-a short and plain statement alleging
facts upon which relief can be granted.'4 2
4. No Requirement of Scienter
Like the other UCL prongs, the fraud prong has no scienter
requirement-that is, the actor need not subjectively know that the
statements are fraudulent.'4 3 As the State Farm court proclaimed,
"[i]t is not necessary to show that the defendant intended to injure
anyone"'44 to state a claim under the UCL. As recently as last year,
the California Supreme Court confirmed that section 17200 does not
carry any requisite level of intent or scienter.'45
139. Id. at 663.
140. Id. at 676.
141. Id. at 669 n.11.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
143. Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 632 (Cal. 2009). But see CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17500 (West 2008).
144. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 233 (Ct. App. 1996)
(citing People ex rel. Van de Kamp v. Cappuccio, Inc., 251 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663-64 (Ct. App.
1988)).
145. See Munson, 208 P.3d at 632; see also Kimberly A. Kralowec, Supreme Court Discusses
UCL "Unlawful" Prong: Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., THE UCL PRAc. (July 23, 2009, 6:00 AM),
http://www.uclpractitioner.com/2009/07/supreme-court-discusses-ucl-unlawful-prong-munson-v-
del-taco-inc.html (discussing an excerpt from the Munson decision and concluding that the
court's "language is also useful for its confirmation that the UCL carries no 'intent' element (or
any other element of scienter)").
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B. Broad Language of the UCL
The three dominant prongs of the UCL have a rich case law
history, and the differing interpretations of that case law demonstrate
the statute's broad overall scope. Prior to the passage of Proposition
64, when the UCL allowed for representative actions brought by
private attorneys general, the law was ostensibly even broader in
scope.146 This was no accident.
The UCL was intentionally written broadly.147 It "has a broader
scope for a reason. '[T]he Legislature . .. intentionally framed [the
UCL] in its broad, sweeping language, precisely to enable judicial
tribunals to deal with the innumerable "new schemes which the
fertility of man's invention would contrive.""' 48
Although the scope of the statute was intentionally broad to
provide maximum protection for consumers and businesses against
unfair competition, the framework also allowed for some abuse.149 As
a result of these actual and perceived abuses of the UCL,
Californians passed Proposition 64 during the November 2004
elections. 1"
C. Proposition 64 and Its Implications on
Standing to Bring UCL Actions
Prior to the passage of Proposition 64,
[a]ctions for relief [under the UCL could be] prosecuted ...
by the Attorney General or any other district attorney or by
any county counsel . . . [or] by a city prosecutor .. . [or] by
a city attorney ... or upon the complaint of any board,
officer, person, corporation or association or by any person
acting for the interests of itself its members or the general
public."'
146. See Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 1999).
147. PERKINS COIE, WHO'S THE FAIREST OF THEM ALL? LITIGATING CLAIMS UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 ET SEQ.) 6 (2009) (on
file with author).
148. Cel-Tech, 973 P.2d at 540 (quoting Am. Philatelic Soc'y v. Claiborne, 46 P.2d 135, 140
(Cal. 1935)).
149. See supra text accompanying note 10.
150. CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 12; see CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, supra note 11, at 40.
151. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 25 (Cal. 2009).
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After California voters approved Proposition 64, section 17204
of the California Business and Professions Code was amended to
read that UCL actions may only be brought by a person "who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of
such unfair competition." 5 2 Further, section 17203 was amended to
read as follows: "[a]ny person may pursue representative claims or
relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing
requirements of section 17204 and complies with Section 382 of the
Code of Civil Procedure." 5 3
D. Requirements for Class Certification
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow class certification
upon a showing of four elements:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.15
For simplification purposes, these class certification requirements are
referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
the class representative, respectively. Additionally, the proposed
class must meet one of the requirements set forth in Rule 23(b)."'
Under California's class-action statute, section 382 of the
California Civil Code of Procedure, one or more plaintiffs may "sue
or defend for the benefit of all"' "when the question is one of a
common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are
numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court.""'
California's statute mirrors the federal rules in that it requires
both a common nucleus of law or fact and enough parties that joinder
is impracticable. Despite the overt similarities between California's
statute and the federal rules, UCL standing requirements following
152. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17203 (West 2008).
153. Id. § 17203.
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
155. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
156. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2009).
157. Id.
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the passage of Proposition 64 were not clear until 2009, when the
California Supreme Court addressed the issue directly in In re
Tobacco II.'5
E. How In re Tobacco II Cases Changes the Game
In May 2009, the California Supreme Court decided In re
Tobacco II, a UCL deceptive-advertising-prong case that presented
issues of first impression raised by the post-Proposition 64 standing
requirements. 159
In In re Tobacco II, plaintiff-consumers brought a class-action
suit against tobacco companies in which the plaintiffs alleged that the
companies had violated the UCL by conducting a long campaign of
deceptive advertising and making misleading statements about both
the addictive nature of nicotine and the relationship between tobacco
use and disease.'60 Before the passage of Proposition 64, the trial
court had certified the case as a class action.16' However, after the
passage of Proposition 64, the trial court decertified the class after
concluding that Proposition 64 required individual standing-that is,
proof of an injury in fact-for each class member.'6 2 In reaching this
conclusion, the trial court made the following finding:
[T]he injury in fact that each class member must show for
standing purposes in this case would presumably consist of
the cost of their cigarette purchases. But significant
questions then arise undermining the purported
commonality among the class members, such as whether
each class member was exposed to Defendants' alleged
false statements and whether each member purchased
cigarettes 'as a result' of the false statements. Clearly ...
individual issues predominate, making class treatment
unmanageable and inefficient.'
158. See In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 25 (Cal. 2009).
159. Id.
160. Id
161. In re Tobacco H Cases, No. JCCP 4042, 2004 WL 2445337, at *2 (Cal. Superior Ct.
Aug. 4, 2004) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants' four motions for summary
judgment).
162. In re Tobacco II Cases, No. JCCP 4042, 2005 WL 579720, at *6-7 (Cal. Superior Ct.
Mar. 7, 2005) (order granting motion for class decertification).
163. Id. at *6.
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Following the decertification of the class, plaintiffs appealed.
The court of appeal affirmed, approving the trial court's
interpretation of Proposition 64's "injury in fact" requirement as
applied in this particular class-action setting.' Because of the
paramount importance of interpreting Proposition 64 uniformly, the
California Supreme Court granted certiorari.16 1 On review, the court
addressed two issues: (1) who must meet the standing requirement in
a UCL class action, the representative plaintiff or all class members;
and (2) what is required to establish standing under the UCL as
amended by Proposition 64.166
1. Only the Class Representative Must Meet
Proposition 64's Standing Requirements
With respect to the first issue, the In re Tobacco II court looked
to the legislative intent underlying Proposition 64 in order to
determine whether the drafters intended to impose standing
requirements on absent class members. In doing so, the court found
no ambiguities in the statutory authority. The court focused on the
statutory language of the amended UCL:
[T]he references in section 17203 to one who wishes to
pursue UCL claims on behalf of others are in the singular;
that is, the "person" and the "claimant" who pursues such
claims must meet the standing requirements of
section 17204 and comply with Code of Civil Procedure
section 382. The conclusion that must be drawn from these
words is that only this individual-the representative
plaintiff-is required to meet the standing requirements.
Thus, the plain language of the statute lends no support to
the trial court's conclusion that all unnamed class members
in a UCL class action must demonstrate section 17204
standing. 1'
Additionally, the court considered the Proposition 64 ballot materials
and noted that the materials did not reference class actions or give
164. In re Tobacco II Cases, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917, 919 (Ct. App. 2006), rev'd, 207 P.3d 20,
26 (Cal. 2009).
165. In re Tobacco II Cases, 146 P.3d 1250 (Cal. 2006).
166. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 25 (Cal. 2009).
167. Id. at 32.
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"any indication that Proposition 64 was intended in any way to alter
the rules surrounding class certification." 68
2. Clarifying UCL Standing Requirements After Proposition 64
The In re Tobacco II court continued its statutory analysis of the
class certification requirements under Proposition 64 by comparing
California's requirements in section 382169 with federal requirements
in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'" The court
reasoned that because "federal case law is clear that the question of
standing in class actions involves the standing of the class
representative and not the class members,""' the standing
requirement under section 382 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure should be the same.17 2
After considering legislative intent and engaging in statutory
interpretation of section 17204's standing requirements as amended
by Proposition 64, the California Supreme Court ultimately held that
the standing requirements in a UCL class action brought in
accordance with section 17203 of the California Business and
Professions Code and with section 382 are applicable only to the
class representatives where class requirements have otherwise been
satisfied. 17 3 This conclusion is the touchstone of the court's opinion
and has formed the basis of much discussion among UCL
practitioners. 174
IV. THE COMMONALITY PROBLEM IN UCL CLASS CERTIFICATIONS
Under the new statutory scheme and pursuant to the California
Supreme Court's interpretation of the existing law, only the class
168. Id. at 33.
169. CAL. CODE OF Civ. PROC. § 382 (West 2004).
170. In re Tobacco II, 207 P.3d at 33-34.
171. Id. at 34.
172. See id. ("Generally standing in a class action is assessed solely with respect to class
representatives, not unnamed members of the class." (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool
Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 310 (S.D. Ill. 2007))).
173. See id. at 35.
174. See e.g., Kimberly A. Kralowec, Another New Opinion Interpreting Tobacco II: Cohen
v. DirecTV, Inc., THE UCL PRAC., http://www.uclpractitioner.com/2009/10/another-new-
opinion-interpreting-tobacco-ii-cohen-v-directv-inc.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2010); Kimberly A.
Kralowec, Two More Articles on In Re Tobacco II, THE UCL PRAC.,
http://www.uclpractitioner.com/2009/10/two-more-articles-on-in-re-tobacco-ii.html (last visited
Oct. 21, 2010).
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representative must successfully meet the new Proposition 64
standing requirements."' But a proposed class must still reach the
class-certification stage.7 6 In order to pass the hurdles of class
certification, a proposed class must meet the statutory requirements
imposed by section 382 of the California Civil Code of Procedure."
This section examines the mounting difficulties in certifying a UCL
class in compliance with the court's current interpretation of the
commonality requirement.
Section 382 imposes two requirements for class certification: the
"existence of an ascertainable class" and "a well-defined community
of interest in the question of law and fact involved.""' The first
inquiry-whether a class is ascertainable-is based on three factors:
"(1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class, and (3) the means
available for identifying the class members.""' The second inquiry-
whether there exists a community of interest-is based on three
factors: "(1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class
representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3)
class representative who can adequately represent the class."'o8 The
community-of-interest requirement for class certification is most
relevant to understanding the current trend in UCL class certification
orders and denials.
Since the passage of Proposition 64, UCL plaintiffs have had
difficulty certifying class actions as a result of courts' widespread
denial of class certification for lack of commonality.' 8 ' After In re
Tobacco II, however, courts applied the California Supreme Court's
interpretation that the new standing requirements applied only to the
class representative.182 Nevertheless, some courts continue to use
earlier interpretations of the post-Proposition 64 UCL standing
175. In re Tobacco II, 207 P.3d at 34.
176. See id. at 30.
177. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 2004).
178. Vasquez v. Superior Ct., 484 P.2d 964, 969 (Cal. 1971).
179. Reyes v. Bd. of Supervisors, 242 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (Ct. App. 1987).
180. Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 23, 28 (Cal. 1981).
181. See generally Linda S. Woolf, Managing Partner, Goodell, DeVries, Leech & Dann,
LLP, Presentation at the FDCC Annual Meeting: Reliance Requirements in Consumer Fraud
Class Actions: Courts Continue to Struggle to Strike the Proper Balance, 3 (July 26-Aug. 2,
2009) (transcript available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents/document.cf
m?DocumentlD=2363) ("Strict enforcement of reliance requirements for all class members
makes certification virtually impossible.").
182. In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 31 (Cal. 2009).
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requirements, denying class certification or decertifying previously
certified classes on the grounds that individualized issues
predominate.'83 And while In re Tobacco I's progeny confirm that
individualized proof of common injury is not necessary under
Proposition 64,184 some courts have continued to require such proof
as part of the underlying prima facie case under the UCL.'"
In granting or denying class certification, courts have focused on
individualized issues with respect to whether a defendant has
engaged in an unfair business practice. Further, courts have been
careful not to decide the issue of commonality based on the injuries
suffered by the consumer or purchaser.16
For example, in Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Insurance
Co.,'" the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the
decertification of a UCL class based on a lack of commonality.'88
Defendants argued that individual issues regarding whether there was
an unfair business practice predominated, and the court agreed.189
However, upon a closer examination of the facts, the plaintiff
made a credible argument for class certification based on the
uniformly misleading sales and marketing practices the defendant
183. See Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 49 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming the
trial court's denial of class certification of a proposed class of subscribers to DIRECTV's High
Definition Package because the plaintiff could not show that common issues of law or fact would
predominate, disregarding the California Supreme Court's In re Tobacco II interpretation of
Proposition 64 as imposing injury-in-fact and reliance requirements only on the class
representative).
184. See Morgan v. AT&T Wireless Servs. Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 783 (Ct. App. 2009)
(holding that pre-Proposition 64 case law describing the conduct outlawed under the UCL
continues to apply after Proposition 64 and that "[t]he only difference is that, after Proposition 64,
plaintiffs (but not absent class members in a class action) must establish that they meet the
Proposition 64 standing requirements" (citing In re Tobacco II, 207 P.3d at 25)); see also THE
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC., CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, COURT APPLIES TOBACCO II:
PROP 64 CHANGED STANDING REQUIREMENTS, NOT SUBSTANTIVE LAW 1 (Oct. 9, 2009) ("The
appeals court [in Morgan] confirmed that although Proposition 64 altered the standing
requirements for a UCL claim, it did not alter the substantive rules governing business and
competitive conduct.").
185. See, e.g., Kaldenbach v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637, 653 (Ct.
App. 2009) (finding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
individualized issues predominated where independent contractor agents sold "vanishing" life
insurance products).
186. Id. at 652.
187. 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637.
188. Id. at 653.
189. Id.
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employed.' The Kaldenbach case involved a plaintiff who alleged
that "he was induced through improper and deceptive sales practices
to purchase" the defendant's "vanishing premium" life insurance
plan.'9 ' Like most life insurance policies, that plan included a
traditional annual-premium-payment component in which the policy
holder makes cash payments to the insurer in exchange for a
specified sum upon the policy holder's death.' Unlike most other
life insurance plans, the particular policy that Kaldenbach purchased
also included an investment component wherein the insurer would
invest Kaldenbach's accumulated premium payments to generate a
self-sustaining return.'93 In other words, after Kaldenbach spent a
certain number of years paying a premium, the premiums were
scheduled to "vanish," and the investment returns would fund the life
insurance policy until its maturity date.'94 After the insurance
company notified him that the investment returns were insufficient to
cover his premiums, Kaldenbach filed a UCL class action against the
insurance company alleging that all sales of vanishing-premium
policies were based on misleading sales presentations that omitted
material facts.19 His proposed class included Californians who
purchased the same life insurance policy from Mutual of Omaha
between December 31, 1995 and January 1, 1998.1'9
Ultimately, the court affirmed decertification because a variety
of independent-contractor sales agents had sold the defendant's
insurance policies.' The court concluded that, in order to meet the
commonality requirement for class certification, the plaintiffs had to
prove that those sales representatives "took Mutual's [life insurance
sales] training, read its manuals, and routinely followed the training
and materials."'" The plaintiffs also had to prove that the "materials,
disclosures, representations, and explanations" given to purchasers
were misleading in substantially the same way.19
190. See id. at 649.
191. Id. at 641.
192. See id. at 640.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 640 n.1.
195. Id. at 641.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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Here, the record reflects that Kaldenbach presented evidence of
a truly misleading and deceptive business practice. Agents
represented the vanishing premiums to consumers as self-fulfilling
investments that required up-front premium payments in exchange
for essentially free life insurance policies once the investment returns
were applied.200 While to some skeptics, and in light of the recent
global financial downturn, the economics of such vanishing-premium
policies might not make much economic sense,201 this hindsight view
should not have any bearing on the reasonableness of the consumer's
reliance.
The reality, in this case, is that the policy was represented in this
vanishing-premium manner to hundreds of Californians.20 2 And
although the concept of the vanishing-premium life insurance policy
is precariously balanced on projected investment returns,203 a
reasonable consumer is not assumed to be overly financially savvy
and therefore should not be expected to foresee an economic
downturn where the instruments were paraded as safe and reliable.
Instead, a reasonable consumer is likely to believe a well-presented
sales pitch. The idea of a vanishing premium is likely to persuade a
reasonable consumer that the policy would produce the advertised
results. Thus, if this particular life insurance policy violates
section 17200 or section 17500, the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Furthermore, if hundreds of similarly situated plaintiffs purchased
the same vanishing-premium life insurance policies, they should be
entitled to relief as well. It appears that the most efficient manner of
adjudicating these claims-where the plaintiffs bought the same
insurance policy from the same parent company-is the class-action
vehicle. Consequently, construing the class certification requirements
too strictly violates the policies underlying class actions and restricts
access to justice for those plaintiffs who lack the knowledge or
capital to would not independently initiate lawsuits but would benefit
greatly from joining a class action.
200. Id at 640-41.
201. See Peter Katt, Vanishing-Premium Policy Designs: The Good and the Bad, AM. J. OF
INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, Feb. 1998, reprinted at Articles, KATT & COMPANY, at
http://www.peterkatt.com/articles/aaiil7.html.
202. Kaldenbach, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 641.
203. See id. at 640.
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Kaldenbach is significant for its illustration of UCL class-
certification obstacles, and because it presents a particularly
compelling example of where a more expansive definition of
commonality or community of interest would benefit those
consumers wishing to bring a UCL claim as a class.
V. CALIFORNIA COURTS SHOULD EVALUATE COMMONALITY OF
DEFENDANT'S UNLAWFUL, UNFAIR, OR FRAUDULENT CONDUCT,
NOT COMMONALITY OF CLASS-MEMBER RELIANCE
Of the elements necessary to establish a community of interest,
the first requirement-that there be predominant common questions
of law or fact-is of most interest in the UCL context.2" This is
because of the reality of changing, modem business practices that
use new technologies and consequently affect individuals in
increasingly different ways.20 5 For example, outsourcing sales to
independent contractors may eliminate one element of commonality
if the independent sales representatives utilize different marketing
materials or make unofficial representations about the product in
their individual capacities.206 This argument-that consumers receive
the unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent product or practice through
different channels-is one of several arguments UCL defendants
204. Class certification requires both a showing of a community of interest among proposed
class members and a presentation of an ascertainable class. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West
2004). Since the community-of-interest inquiry is more extensive than identifying the
ascertainable class, and because the community-of-interest inquiry has a corresponding three-
element test, this class-certification requirement is of most interest to the forthcoming discussion.
See id.
205. Advertisements reach consumers in a variety of different ways. See generally
Knowledge@Wharton, Technology Is Changing the Advertising Business, CNET NEWS, (Feb. 3,
2001, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-251882.html (describing the creative
advertising schemes born of technological advances). Cond6 Nast, a publisher of nineteen
magazines, has already prepared digital magazines, which presumably will include
advertisements, for use on Apple Computer's iPad. Stephanie Clifford, Conde Nast Is Preparing
iPad Versions ofSome oflts Top Magazines, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at B6.
Facebook, a social networking website, reserves the right to gather information from user
profiles and to display advertisements targeted to Facebook users based on content the users
display on their internet profiles. See Facebook Ads-Optimization: Using the Insights Tool,
Reaching Your Exact Audience, Writing Engaging Text, FACEBOOK, 4 (May 27, 2008),
http://ads.ak.facebook.com/
ads/FacebookAds/ad optimization final.pdf (illustrating the various filters available to
advertisers, including targeting audiences based on geographic location, workplace, relationship
status, age, gender, and any other keyword displayed on profiles).
206. See, e.g., Kaldenbach, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 649.
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have made to defeat class certification.20 7 Prior to the In re Tobacco
II decision, California courts tended to require a showing of
commonality of class-member injury and reliance.208 After the
decision, courts trended toward requiring a showing of commonality
with respect to the defendant's alleged wrongdoing.
Other than Proposition 64, the vast majority of law interpreting
the UCL statutes is case law, so it is difficult to remedy the
commonality issues through legislation. Additionally, Proposition 64
supporters might perceive a legislative remedy as contravening the
people's vote. Instead, the change must come through a shift in
judicial interpretation of the UCL class-certification requirements.
Such a shift is necessary to accommodate changing business
practices, new technologies, and increasingly scattered channels of
advertising.
Because today's consumer marketing takes many different
forms,209 it has become increasingly difficult to argue that a particular
business act or practice affected a certain (large) class of consumers
in a substantially similar way without reducing the class size to a
level that can be managed outside of the class-action vehicle.
For example, commercials and other representations of the
function or quality of products may now reach consumers through
different, and oftentimes variant, channels of distribution.210 Print
advertisements in newspapers and magazines, billboard
advertisements, radio messages, video clip messages tacked on to the
beginning of streaming internet videos, and banner ads on websites
make up just some of the methods that manufacturers employ to
introduce their products to consumers.2 1' If one of these messages
were found to violate the UCL, then a proposed class of plaintiffs
would have to meet the burden of proving common issues of law or
fact. To do so would presumably require the class members to have
seen the same advertisement or substantially the same message; to
have relied on that message in the same way; and to have been
207. See id. at 643-45.
208. See Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47-49 (holding that there was a lack
of commonality of interest among the proposed class members and interpreting the California
Supreme Court's decision in In re Tobacco H as addressing only procedural standing issues).
209. See Knowledge@Wharton, supra note 205.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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affected by the false, unfair, fraudulent, or deceptive business act or
advertisement in the same or a similar way.
But this analysis only considers one form of the commonality
problem-the common receipt of information. The commonality
issue raised by UCL class actions extends farther, reaching the
individual plaintiffs proof of the existence of an unfair, unlawful,
fraudulent, or deceptive business act or practice.
Further, traditional notions of commonality do not meet today's
consumer-protection needs. As illustrated by the Kaldenbach case,
even limiting the scope of the commonality question to whether the
defendant committed an act or business practice prohibited by
section 17200 or section 17500 is insufficient to satisfy class
certification where there is a genuine showing of wrongdoing
prohibited by the UCL.2 12 The current notion of commonality must
therefore undergo a revision to meet the modem aims of consumer
protection.2 13 Courts should apply a more flexible standard of
commonality 214 in which deceptive business practices like those in
Kaldenbach can be remedied through the class-action vehicle. This
would serve the efficiency purpose underlying class actions by
aggregating individual claims together in a coordinated lawsuit.
212. See Kaldenbach, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 653.
213. The FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection website identifies its consumer-protection
goals as: protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business practices in the
marketplace; educating consumers about their rights; and protecting consumers by enforcing
federal truth-in-advertising laws, particularly those laws pertaining to food, drugs, and high-tech
products. David Vladeck, About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.fic.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
214. Such a standard would shift focus to the unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct of the
defendant. It would also consider whether common issues of law or fact exist within the alleged
wrongful conduct. This shift in focus would protect plaintiffs from class certification denials in
cases where the defendant's unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct clearly rises to a level
actionable under the UCL and certifying a class would meet the underlying goals of class-action
litigation. But where the dissemination or reach of the unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct to
members of the proposed class has an individualistic streak, like that of the subcontractors used
by Mutual of Omaha Life Insurance, courts are more reluctant to certify a class. See Kaldenbach,
100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 649. When deciding whether there exists sufficient commonality to certify a
class, it is important for courts to balance the interests both ways. Simply because there are some
differences in consumer receipt of unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct should not serve to
destroy class certification completely, particularly where the other factors weighing in favor of
class certification are very high.
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VI. A BROADER CONSTRUCTION OF COMMONALITY WILL BENEFIT
CONSUMERS AND ENSURE GREATER ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Expanding the definition of commonality would not only benefit
those consumers wishing to aggregate their claims and shift case-
management to the class representative, but it would also benefit
UCL defendants by decreasing their litigation costs." Redefining
commonality to focus more on a defendant's unfair, unlawful, or
fraudulent business practice would also increase the efficiency of the
judicial process with respect to UCL claims. By certifying a class in
situations where the court otherwise would have objected to class
certification, defendants will avoid an onslaught of individual
lawsuits against them and consolidate witness testimony and
litigation of common issues into one action.
While a new approach to commonality, which weighs common
issues of fact or law with respect to a defendant's conduct more
heavily than individualized issues of receipt or impact on class
members, may result in an increase of class-certification orders in
UCL matters, such a result is not to be disfavored. Class actions,
while complex, serve an important function in American civil
litigation because they ensure more comprehensive access to justice
for those class members that would not otherwise pursue their
claims. Here, a broader definition of commonality would ensure that
prospective UCL class-action members have the option of bundling
their claims together and distributing the costs of litigation among
themselves, promoting efficiency and removing the financial
disincentive to litigating where the cost of individual litigation
exceeds the damages for each class member.
Redefining commonality would also deter those defendants
contemplating violating the UCL, because emphasizing a defendant's
wrongdoing will likely make class certification easier. Once a class
has been certified, the cost-benefit calculus for many defendants tilts
in favor of an out-of-court settlement because losing to a class is
usually more expensive than losing to a single plaintiff.2 16 While this
215. Where there are claims against a particular defendant in the order of hundreds or
thousands, class actions create a more uniform litigation scheme and allow a defendant to resolve
most or substantially all claims without the need to individually negotiate settlement agreements
or independently defend each individual claim.
216. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1255 (2002).
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increased pressure on defendants to settle is one undesired 217 effect of
redefining commonality because it may cause some risk-averse
defendants to settle unmeritorious cases against them, the overall
effect would still benefit consumers and promote their access to
justice because it would make class actions more accessible in cases
where there is a legitimate predicate for a UCL violation. Courts'
increased willingness to look to a defendant's alleged unfair,
unlawful, or fraudulent business activities when considering
commonality for class certification would encourage potential UCL
violators to act with caution when engaging in business practices that
could conceivably amount to unfair competition under California's
UCL statutes. This is because defendants would recognize that the
commonality barrier has become less ominous for UCL plaintiffs and
prospective class members. The net effect would be to decrease the
overall occurrence of business practices that harm consumers-
whether causing harm to their health, like the alleged UCL violation
in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases,21 8 or harm to their economic
interests, like the alleged UCL violation in Kaldenbach.2 19
Lastly, redefining commonality to more heavily weigh the
unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct of defendants in class-
certification determinations would better enable both public and
private enforcement of the UCL. Revisiting the Kaldenbach case, an
increased willingness to factor the defendant's allegedly fraudulent
conduct into the commonality inquiry would likely result in a more
favorable class-certification determination for the plaintiffs.2 20 In that
case, the life insurance policies all included the vanishing-premium
217. This Note suggests that courts redefine commonality within the scope of class-
certification determinations under sections 17200-17500 of the California Business and
Professions Code by placing more emphasis on a finding of common issues of fact or law among
a UCL defendant's unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent conduct. This Note does not encourage a shift
in defining commonality for purposes of coercing UCL defendants into settlement. In reality, the
costs of defending a class-action suit may be more than a defendant is willing to bear, based on
the probability of success on the merits. In theory, however, this Note proceeds under the
assumption that all class-action suits will continue through the litigation process. Under this
assumption, shifting the definition of commonality to more heavily weigh a UCL defendant's
wrongdoing will simply provide potential class members with the option of pursuing their claims
more easily through the class-action vehicle, instead of leaving them to pursue independent
claims for damages that might otherwise be nominal in relation to the time, money, and
opportunity cost that goes into bringing an individual UCL suit against a business entity.
218. 175 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Cal. 2008).
219. 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637, 641 (Ct. App. 2009).
220. See id. at 652.
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mechanism, and the underlying complaint was about the deceptive
nature and representation of the premiums.221 The court focused
primarily on individualized receipt-that the policies were sold by
subcontractors who probably represented the policies in varying
ways-rather than on the common issues of fact or law.222 Had the
court focused on the policies' similarities, and their shared risks of a
fluctuating market and nonguaranteed returns, it could have certified
the class. Redefining commonality would likely produce a different
class-certification result under the Kaldenbach facts. By certifying
the Kaldenbach class, the court would have better served the
interests of UCL plaintiffs and increased access to justice for those
consumers wishing to join a class-action lawsuit instead of pursuing
individual claims.
Likewise, the 2008 ARPS freeze plaintiffs would have benefited
from a new approach to commonality.223 Investors who purchased the
ARPS based on broker representations that the securities were as
liquid as savings accounts or money market accounts224 could bring a
consolidated UCL action against each bank for alleged UCL
violations. Redefining commonality to emphasize the unfair,
unlawful, and deceptive conduct of the banks and brokerage firms
that sold the ARPS without disclosing the associated liquidity risks
would allow investors to more easily meet class certification and
bring a UCL class action to recoup their losses. While many ARPS
investors who brought class actions against banks and brokers that
sold them the ARPS under the guise of safe, liquid investments were
unsuccessful at the class-certification stage,2 25 banks eventually
compensated some of them through settlements or by redeeming the
ARPS at face value to appease angry investors. 226 The willingness of
221. Id. at 641.
222. Id. at 652.
223. See supra Part 1IIA.
224. See Walter Hamilton et al., Wells to Buy Back Frozen Securities, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19,
2009, at B 1.
225. See Gretchen Morgenson, A Way Out of the Deep Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at
BU 1.
226. See, e.g., Associated Press, Bank ofAmerica, Accused of Misleading Customers, Agrees
to Buy Back Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A30; Associated Press, Citigroup and UBS
Agree to Buy Back Risky Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008 at B8; Justin Cole, UBS Joins
Citi, Merrill in Mass Buyback of Stressed Securities, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 9, 2008,
available at http://news.smh.com.au/world/ubs-joins-citi-merrill-in-mass-buyback-of-stressed-
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banks to compensate customers for ARPS losses without the need for
litigation is a good thing. However, not all banks that sold ARPS
agreed to redeem funds right away.227 This not only exposed those
institutions to liability, but also means that the commonality
discussion is still very much relevant for ARPS investors. With a
fresh perspective on commonality, these investors would be better
equipped to bring UCL class actions against the remaining banks,
and in doing so, they will more easily reach their day in court.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although courts are still in the process of building the
boundaries of Proposition 64 and In re Tobacco II, recent opinions
suggest that courts are still struggling to formulate a clear standard
for class certification of UCL claims.228 In some cases where there is
a credible argument that a defendant violated the UCL, courts deny
class certification based on minute differences of fact.229
While the class-action vehicle is not to be abused, it is available
to plaintiffs who suffer similar injuries for an important reason:
plaintiffs who suffer relatively minimal individual damages, like
some plaintiffs in the Cohen case,230 lack incentive to litigate because
the cost of litigation exceeds the value of the possible judgment. But
in the aggregate, the damage from a defendant's unlawful conduct is
a harm that should not go unremedied because individual damages,
multiplied across the spectrum of injured plaintiffs, produce a
substantial injury to the whole of the potential class. Therefore,
courts must recognize that redefining commonality for the UCL-
litigation niche would serve the important goal of putting the class-
action vehicle to its intended use, while simultaneously producing
procompetitive benefits and increasing access to justice for similarly
situated plaintiffs.
securities-20080809-3si3.html; Cyrus Sanati, Wells Fargo to Repurchase $1.4 Billion of
Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2009, at B8.
227. In September 2010, the first ARPS class-action complaint survived past the complaint
stage. The lawsuit names Raymond James brokerage firm as the defendant. Bloomberg, Raymond
James Auction-Rate Suit Is First to Be Upheld, INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 9, 2010.
228. See Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 37, 47 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming the
denial of class certification of a proposed class of subscribers of DIRECTV's High Definition
Package for high-definition television based on their finding that the plaintiff could not show that
common issues of law or fact would predominate).
229. See supra Part III.A.L.
230. See Cohen, 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 39-40.
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